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The world has witnessed two distinct attempts to build a multi-
lateral mechanism to discipline surplus countries that declined 
to adjust their surpluses, and several proposals are currently on 
the table to do the same. On the two previous occasions the 
major surplus country of the day defeated attempts to create 
such a mechanism, and today China (not to mention Japan 
or Germany) exhibits no enthusiasm for the idea. Despite the 
importance of the issue, there has been remarkably little discus-
sion of these proposals. 
The first occasion arose when the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) was being created. During the pre–Bretton Woods 
negotiations, John Maynard Keynes proposed that countries 
would finance their payments imbalances by building up and 
running down bancor balances1 at the putative IMF and that 
excessive balances in either direction would be penalized through 
interest payments. Under this scheme, surplus countries would 
build up large bancor balances on which they would be charged 
interest. The major surplus country of the day, which did not 
1. According to the Keynes Plan, countries would have paid their international 
debts in a synthetic currency called bancor. They would have received an initial 
endowment giving them the right to spend a certain (but limited) quantity of 
bancor.
expect to lose its position, was the United States. It vetoed the 
proposal but provided an alternative, the scarce currency clause. 
In the event, the scarce currency clause proved an ineffective 
discipline. 
The second occasion was during the Committee of Twenty 
negotiations on reforming the international monetary system, 
when the United States had already come to think of itself as a 
chronic deficit country.2 In 1972 the US delegation led by Paul 
Volcker proposed that all countries should be assigned a “reserve 
indicator.” If their reserves came to exceed (or fall short of) this 
indicative level by a specified percentage, they would have an 
obligation to adjust their surplus (or deficit). One acceptable 
mechanism of adjustment for a surplus country was currency 
revaluation, although if a country preferred it could expand 
demand or stimulate long-term capital outflows or increase aid, 
but it would have an obligation to adopt effective adjustment 
actions. Germany was the great surplus country of the day, and 
together with its European partners, vetoed the Volcker Plan.
A recent policy brief by my colleague Morris Goldstein 
(2010) proposes to use the IMF as the instrument for disci-
plining surplus countries. Countries showing large and persis-
tent current account surpluses would have to receive a Fund 
mission, whose purpose would be to judge whether the country 
had a misaligned exchange rate. Depending on the size and 
persistence of any misalignment it diagnosed, the negotiations 
might remain private or be made public for larger misalign-
ments, or for the gravest failures they might involve trade retalia-
tion authorized through the World Trade Organization (WTO).
2. In fact the United States still had a current account surplus at that time, 
but attention was in those days focused on the official settlements balance, in 
terms of which the United States did indeed have a deficit.
The division of the burden of 
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In a recent working paper, my colleague Arvind Subramanian 
and his coauthor Aaditya Mattoo (2008) have proposed that 
countries could bring a case for unfair trade through currency 
undervaluation  to  the WTO  dispute  settlement  system.  The 
WTO would seek to establish the facts of the matter from the 
IMF—whether a currency was being systematically undervalued, 
thus  providing  an  export  subsidy  to  the  country’s  exporters 
and import protection to its import-competing industries and 
whether this was the result of a deliberate government policy. 
But instead of leaving the IMF to mete out punishments to the 
offending government (a task for which it has not been equipped 
by history) as suggested by Goldstein, Mattoo and Subramanian 
propose that the WTO—which wields effective and graduated 
responses to malpractice—should prescribe the punishment. 
In  a  recent  op-ed,  another  colleague  of  mine,  C.  Fred 
Bergsten  (2010),  has  proposed  a  mechanism  that  he  argues 
could  be  used  to  discipline  surplus  countries.  Rather  than 
having an international organization prescribe disciplines, he 
proposes  to  leave  the  instrument—counter-intervention  in 
the currency markets—in national hands, but with the right 
of appeal by the aggrieved party to the IMF. Presumably if one 
feels that his instrument of counter-intervention is practical one 
could substitute it for trade retaliation, most obviously in the 
Goldstein proposal.
Even more recently, US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy 
Geithner, echoing ideas of the Korean G-20 hosts and endorsed 
by Yi Gang, a vice governor of the People’s Bank of China, has 
proposed  that  members  of  the  G-20  should  commit  them-
selves to not running current account imbalances in excess of 
4 percent of GDP.
Other ways of disciplining surplus countries, by limiting 
or taxing the assets that surplus countries hold, have recently 
been  advanced  by  Daniel  Gros  and  Gary  Hufbauer.  While 
these were not proposed in the context of a comprehensive 
plan, they are certainly germane to this discussion. They are 
therefore also considered.
The primary purpose of this policy brief is to compare 
and contrast these proposals. In the later parts of this brief I 
also address the question of how the international community 




In September 1941 Keynes wrote two memoranda for the 
UK  Treasury  on  postwar  currency  policy  (reproduced  in 
Moggridge 1980, 21–40). One of these was largely backward-
looking, analyzing the behavior of the gold standard over the 
preceding 500 years. He dismissed the classical theory that 
the gold standard had maintained equilibrium by adjusting 
relative  price  levels  and  argued  that  the  use  of  money  to 
effect international exchanges had been a success only in two 
periods: during silver inflation in the 16th century and when 
international investment had been centered on London in the 
late 19th century and up to World War I. The loans made 
during  the  latter  period  had  been  for  productive  purposes 
and therefore created new sources of revenue to service them, 
while the fact that an increased payments surplus of London 
led to an increase in foreign investment meant that the burden 
of initiating adjustment fell on the creditor. The key reason 
that the system had worked was this transfer of the obliga-
tion of initiating adjustment from the debtor to the creditor: 
During most periods adjustment was viewed as compulsory 
for the debtor and voluntary for the creditor, with the result 
that (as in the interwar period that he cited) it had not worked 
satisfactorily. There is no question that the difficulties of the 
interwar period had made a deep impression on Keynes: He 
came to the conclusion that a system in which the surplus 
countries  could  sterilize  reserve  accumulation  in  unlimited 
amounts was bound to throw the entire burden of adjustment 
on deficit countries and therefore make the system suffer from 
a deflationary bias.
This memorandum may not have been among Keynes’s 
great contributions to economic analysis, but it was impor-
tant in inspiring one of the truly novel proposals contained 
in the second memorandum, on his International Clearing 
Union. This memorandum assumed that the postwar world 
would remain Schachtian3 in the sense that the international 
transactions of each country would be cleared through the 
central bank but very un-Schachtian in what would happen 
3. Hjalmar Schacht was the governor of the Reichsbank, the German central 
bank, for much of the interwar period, including the Nazi years. He developed 
an elaborate mechanism of bilateral clearing with other European countries 
that depended upon all foreign payments to and from those countries being 
routed through the two central banks responsible.
On the two previous occasions the 
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to the net balances. Rather than a network of bilateral agree-
ments, with pressures on deficit countries to sell more or buy 
less with that particular bilateral partner and on the surplus 
countries to sell less or buy more bilaterally, tending to lead 
to a set of bilaterally balanced (and therefore inefficient) trade 
positions, Keynes envisaged each central bank settling only its 
net multilateral position in credit with the Clearing Union (as 
actually happened with the European Payments Union). Each 
country would be assigned a quota with the Clearing Union 
(expressed in bancor, a unit of account) equal to half the value 
of its average total visible trade for the last five prewar years. It 
could borrow a sum equal to its quota by running multilateral 
deficits or could build up its bancor balance by running multi-
lateral surpluses. But if it departed too far from the bancor 
balance originally assigned, it would become subject to adjust-
ment pressures. 
Specifically, a country whose bancor balance fell by 25 
percent  would  be  entitled  to  depreciate  by  5  percent;  one 
whose balance fell by an average of over 50 percent could be 
obliged to depreciate 5 percent (or to sell the Clearing Union 
gold and/or to prohibit capital exports). Conversely, a country 
whose  bancor  balance  increased  by  25  percent  would  be 
entitled to revalue by 5 percent, and if its bancor balance aver-
aged over 150 percent of quota it could be obliged to revalue 
by 5 percent (or obliged to release any frozen foreign-owned 
balances). Countries would pay interest on both borrowings 
from the Clearing Union and excessive holdings of bancor; 
specifically,  a  surplus  country  would  be  charged  5  percent 
interest on the excess over 125 percent of quota and 10 percent 
on the excess over 150 percent. Any balance in excess of 200 
percent would be liable to forfeiture. 
Three  forms  of  pressure  were  therefore  to  have  been 
exerted on surplus countries.4 They would have been subject 
to payment (rather than receipt) of interest, if their cumulative 
surplus got large. If it got very large, they would essentially 
face seizure and get no benefit from the additional exports. 
And they would have had to adopt adjustment policies that 
would have been decided for them by a third party. History has 
tended to regard the first of these pressures, through interest 
payments, as the decisive one. In fact the other two appear 
much more onerous, if and when they were in fact brought 
to bear, but they would have kicked in only if the country 
made an error or chose to defy the international community, 
whereas  the first was expected to be regularly levied.
The ability to exert pressure for adjustment on surplus 
countries was an important issue for Britain, which was at that 
time dominated by Keynesian fears of permanent deflationary 
4. The first and third pressures would have been imposed symmetrically for 
deficit countries.
pressures emanating from the United States. However, much 
of  the  Keynes  Plan  was  regarded  as  quite  unacceptable  in 
Washington: It proposed creating a new international money, 
it gave no special role to the dollar despite the fact that the 
dollar  was  already  the  world’s  dominant  currency,  and  it 
created what Washington envisaged would be an inflationary 
amount of international liquidity. In a December 1942 revi-
sion, the Americans offered to graft onto their alternative plan 
(the White Plan, which was quite similar to that ultimately 
adopted) a scarce currency clause intended to deal with the 
British concern with the absence of pressures on surplus coun-
tries. This clause allowed the Fund to declare a currency scarce 
if an excess demand for it was manifest in the Fund exhausting 
its supplies, whereupon debtor countries would be entitled to 
discriminate against payments to the country whose currency 
had been declared scarce (assumed to be the United States). 
Since the Fund never exhausted its supplies of dollars or other 
currencies and alternative means of providing currencies to 
the Fund were in due course invented (notably through the 
General Arrangements to Borrow), the scarce currency clause 
has never been invoked.
The Committee of Twenty
The Committee of Twenty was intended to reform the world 
monetary system following the demise of the Bretton Woods 
arrangements  in  August  1971.  It  consisted  of  the  finance 
ministers of the 20 countries then represented on the IMF’s 
Executive Board, but most of the work was done by meet-
ings of their deputies (ministry of finance officials and central 
bankers). The committee and its deputies met from late 1972 
to mid-1974, by which time it had long been apparent that the 
negotiations were deadlocked. The 1973 oil crisis provided an 
excuse to declare that it would be necessary to live temporarily 
with an unreformed system incorporating the big change that 
had happened against most official wishes—floating exchange 
rates. The world has lived, if not always happily, with this 
“system” ever since.
The US proposals for reform of the international monetary 
system  were  first  presented  at  the  1972  IMF/World  Bank   
Annual Meetings by Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz, 
further  elaborated  by  the  US  deputy,  Paul  Volcker,  at  the 
deputies meeting in November 1972, and a few months later 
published in the Report of the Council of Economic Advisors. 
The three basic proposals, of which the first two were heavily 
interdependent, were reserve indicators, convertibility of the 
dollar into primary reserve assets, and multicurrency interven-
tion. The proposal of multicurrency intervention was intended 
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ibility was intended to assuage European sensibilities, but the 
United States emphasized that these could be honored only if 
there was assurance that other countries would not make exces-
sive demands.
It  envisaged  the  reserve  indicator  proposal  as  inter  alia 
providing that necessary reassurance. Each country was to have 
a reserve indicator, with a norm. Just how this was to be selected 
was not specified as part of the plan; possibilities outlined were 
in proportion to IMF quotas and based on past reserve levels, 
but it was important to the proposal that the sum of those 
norms should roughly equal the level of reserves in existence. 
The reserve norms would be surrounded by two warning points 
and, further removed, by an “outer point” and a “low point.” 
If a country’s reserves moved beyond the warning points 
there would be a strong presumption that the country should 
adjust, although the means to be used were left to the discre-
tion of the individual country involved. But if reserves moved 
toward either the outer point or the low point, the country 
would be expected to apply measures of “progressive inten-
sity.” If reserves actually hit either of these points, the country 
would become subject to “pressures” if a program of adjust-
ment deemed adequate by the Fund were not in place. Which 
measures  were  to  constitute  the  pressures  were  not  spelled 
out,  but  possible  pressures  on  surplus  countries  that  were 
mentioned by the United States were the loss of scheduled 
allocations of special drawing rights (SDRs), an authoriza-
tion to impose import surcharges on the offending country’s 
exports, and (again) a tax on excess reserves.
The pressures on surplus countries were not as explicitly 
defined as in the Keynes Plan, presumably because this was 
intended to be a negotiating position and the United States 
would accommodate its partners by giving substance to the 
ideas in the way that they found most congenial. In practice, 
negotiations never got to the point where partner countries 
were required to define their preferences. The principles that 
the United States sought to establish were nonetheless clear. 
CurrenT ProPosals
The Goldstein Proposal
Unlike  both  of  the  previous  occasions,  most  of  the  current 
proposals for disciplining surplus countries were launched in 
nonofficial papers. In one of these, my colleague Morris Goldstein 
(2010, 5) proposes  that any country that runs a current account 
surplus greater than (say) 4 percent of GDP over a one-year 
period should automatically receive an ad hoc consultation by 
the Fund (meaning the staff) to discuss its exchange rate policy. 
The Fund (meaning its Executive Board) would summarize its 
views at the end of the process by issuing a verdict, or ruling, as 
to whether the member in question is fulfilling its international 
obligations on exchange rate policy. He writes that in broad 
terms “the test should be whether the country’s real effective 
exchange  rate  is  seriously  misaligned,  whether  the  country’s 
policies—intentionally or not—contribute materially to that 
misalignment,  and  whether  the  misalignment  harms  signifi-
cantly the country’s trading partners.” In some cases the Fund 
would presumably find that a country either needs no action 
(perhaps because the imbalance is expected to disappear) or is 
reacting appropriately, and if the judgment is wrong the Fund 
would have to wait only 12 months before sending another 
mission. But in other cases the Executive Board would need to 
indicate that the country is violating its membership obligations 
and that it must eliminate its noncompliance in a timely way. 
Failing such timely elimination of noncompliance, the Board 
would have to impose penalties.
Penalties should be graduated to the size of the failing. 
For misalignments of under 10 percent and up to a year’s 
duration,  Goldstein  envisages  only  intensive  (but  private) 
consultations with the Fund. For misalignments of 10 to 25 
percent and a duration of one to two years, the Fund should 
go public and ask for a specific plan (and the country would 
not be able to veto publication of the report). For countries 
with even larger misalignments that refuse to commit cred-
ibly to a proposed plan of action to improve the situation, he 
proposes that the WTO approve trade policy retaliation. In 
addition, countries in this category should temporarily forfeit 
their eligibility for new SDR allocations and increases in Fund 
quotas. There is no discussion of the necessary WTO proce-
dures, such as whether they should be automatic or follow 
some agreed process.
Note  that  Goldstein  suggests  that  discussions  should 
focus on the appropriateness of the level of the exchange rate. 
This leaves unaddressed an important subject that has recently 
arisen in the European Union, which is whether a creditor 
country has a responsibility to adjust to other members within 
a fixed exchange rate area. 
Morris Goldstein proposes  that any 
country that runs a current account surplus 
greater than (say) 4 percent of GDP over 
a one-year period should automatically 
receive an ad hoc consultation by the 
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The Mattoo-Subramanian Proposal
Mattoo and Subramanian (2008) propose to enlarge the Doha 
Round negotiations on the future of the WTO in two direc-
tions:  (1) employ the WTO dispute settlement system to 
impose penalties when  an exchange rate is undervalued and 
(2) give the WTO jurisdiction over sovereign wealth funds. 
The former aspect is the one of importance in the present 
context,  but  it  is  important  to  be  clear  that  Mattoo  and 
Subramanian do not imagine that China would be willing to 
submit to WTO jurisdiction over its exchange rate policy as 
a matter of goodwill; they propose a bargain in which China 
gains an assurance of continued access for its foreign invest-
ments (plus market economy status in the United States5) in 
return. Whether it would be judged a bargain of sufficient 
weight to induce Chinese acceptance of an international obli-
gation to adjust is another question. 
In  principle  the  WTO  already  has  jurisdiction  over 
undervalued exchange rates because they act in the same way 
as a combined export subsidy and import tariff, and Article 
XV(4) states that “Contracting Parties shall not, by exchange 
action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of [the WTO] 
Agreement….”  But  Mattoo  and  Subramanian  argue  that 
“this is too vague an obligation to provide a basis for effec-
tive enforcement” and that “there is no jurisprudence on this 
provision of the GATT, and it is highly unlikely that WTO 
dispute  settlement  panels  would  be  willing  to  rule  against 
undervalued exchange rates on this tenuous basis” (Mattoo 
and Subramanian 2008, 6). Similarly, Hufbauer, Wong, and 
Sheth (2006) examine the probability of the WTO demanding 
a Chinese revaluation under either Article XV (4) or the Code 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and conclude that 
no case on the matter would be likely to succeed on the basis 
of present obligations.
A  decision  to  start  using  this  power  would  therefore 
amount to a policy change that would require further negotia-
tion, even if it did not lead to a formal change in the rules 
(requiring amendment of the WTO’s charter with attendant 
complications).  The  proposal  of  Mattoo  and  Subramanian 
is  that  a  country  that  felt  threatened  by  another  country’s 
exchange rate policy could refer its complaint to the WTO. 
The WTO could then ask the IMF6 for expert advice on the 
facts of the situation, just as for many years the GATT asked 
5. This would render it less vulnerable to discretionary antidumping and 
countervailing trade-restrictive action.
6. Much hangs on exactly what part of the IMF would provide this advice: 
staff, or staff plus management, or whether an answer has to be approved 
by the Executive Board, with the danger of political paralysis this implies. 
The precedent of IMF expert advice on whether a developing country had a 
payments deficit suggests that the IMF staff, overseen by management, would 
generally write the opinion but that it would require formal approval by the 
Executive Board, which has normally in the past been granted on a lapse of 
time basis.
the Fund for advice on whether a developing country had a 
balance of payments deficit that might justify the imposition 
of import restrictions. Specifically, the WTO should ask the 
IMF two questions: (1) whether an exchange rate is substan-
tially undervalued, and, if so (2) whether the undervaluation 
is demonstrably attributable to government action. An ability 
to answer the first question clearly depends upon the ability 
to declare an exchange rate misaligned with a high measure 
of confidence. Mattoo and Subramanian remark that this is 
“probably not [possible], but that could be a strength rather 
than a weakness because the WTO would regulate only egre-
gious cases of misalignment—where the technical determina-
tion is relatively robust and criticism-proof.”
Personally I think it absurd to doubt that the world can 
recognize misalignments of 15 or 20 percent7 (and there are 
examples where misalignments have been even larger), but one 
needs to recognize that there are economists who have asserted 
that such recognition is impossible, and it will be necessary to 
confront their testimony in making the case for this proposal. 
The other factual question on which the IMF would be asked 
to rule is whether an undervaluation is due to deliberate govern-
ment policy. Here again situations can be as clear as daylight, 
when governments (or central banks or other quasi-government 
agencies) engage in prolonged one-way intervention in foreign 
exchange markets or deliberately peg their currencies to those 
of other countries, and more ambiguous cases in which under-
valuation is caused by fiscal, monetary, or trade policies and 
there is no large, continuous reserve acquisition or official peg. 
Only where it is concluded from the evidence that the central 
policy objective is the external one is it envisaged that the WTO 
should be called on to pressure a country by imposing sanctions 
through the dispute settlement provisions.
If the WTO found that a member country was guilty of 
maintaining  an  undervalued  exchange  rate,  the  member(s) 
who brought the action would gain the right to compensa-
tion or, failing that, to impose sanctions on the exports of the 
country with the undervalued exchange rate. The size of the 
sanctions would be determined by the WTO. The proposal 
implicitly  assumes  that  the  imposition  of  a  surcharge  on 
7. See, for example, Cline and Williamson (2010).
Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian 
have proposed that countries could 
bring a case for unfair trade through 
currency undervaluation to the WTO 
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imports from the offending country would be limited to the 
countries bringing the action, but there would be advantages 
in  requiring  all  WTO  members  to  impose  such  sanctions 
from the standpoints of increasing the potency of the threat 
and avoiding diversion of trade to third countries. However, 
imposing such an obligation would break entirely new ground 
for the WTO and would therefore involve even greater diffi-
culty in obtaining the assent of members.
The Bergsten Proposal: Counter-Intervention
C. Fred Bergsten (2010) has recently proposed that a reserve 
currency  country  should  be  able  to  engage  in  counter-
intervention to push up the value of a currency that is being 
deliberately  held  down  to  an  undervalued  rate  through 
intervention. If the counter-intervention was equal to that 
of the intervention that induced it, the presumption is that 
the exchange rate would be unchanged; correction of the rate 
would require larger intervention (or a policy change in the 
country with the undervalued currency). Thus correction of 
the rate by the reserve currency country would face the issues 
of deciding upon the scale of the intervention or the target 
rate toward which it was aiming. The immediate motivation is 
clearly to enable the United States to retaliate against China, 
but this faces an additional difficulty in that the renminbi is 
not a convertible currency and therefore the United States 
would not be able to invest any renminbi it acquired. 
Bergsten suggests that a way of overcoming this difficulty 
would  be  to  purchase  proxies  like  “nondeliverable  forward 
renminbi contracts and renminbi-denominated debt instru-
ments in Hong Kong,” though this would limit the poten-
tial scope of the counter-intervention to well below the size 
of  Chinese  intervention.  It  would  also  mean  that  China 
would retain in its hands the ability to inflict capital losses 
upon the United States, since these would be determined by 
a comparison of actual renminbi rates on the maturity date 
with the rates prevailing when the securities were purchased. 
It is, furthermore, not obvious that this would put pressure 
on China.
There are at least two versions of the proposal presented 
in Bergsten’s op-ed. In the first, a reserve currency country 
takes the initiative but can be challenged in the IMF; if the 
IMF takes the side of the surplus country, the reserve currency 
country has to back off. In the second version, the IMF autho-
rizes a reserve currency country to act. The first version will be 
discussed in what follows.
The Geithner Proposal: Current Account Targets
The proposal that is here attributed to US Secretary of the 
Treasury Timothy Geithner in fact has a prehistory. As hosts 
of the then-impending Seoul summit of the G-20, Korean 
officials had been quietly urging a commitment of the G-20 
countries to limit their payments imbalances to a maximum 
of 4 percent of GDP, a formula that according to one account 
had been suggested by China. The suggestion was endorsed by 
Yi Gang (2010), a vice governor of the People’s Bank of China 
and head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, in 
a speech to a seminar at the 2010 IMF/World Bank Annual 
Meetings  in  Washington.  Hence  when  Secretary  Geithner 
proposed  at  the  Gyeongju  meeting  of  the  G-20  Finance 
Ministers  that  each  of  the  G-20  countries  should  aim  at 
limiting the size of its imbalance below 4 percent of GDP, he 
appeared to be pushing on an open door (though objections, 
especially by Germany, subsequently surfaced). He acknowl-
edged that there would need to be exceptions for countries 
exporting natural resources but urged the others to agree that 
they would pursue structural, fiscal, and exchange rate policies 
consistent with a maximum imbalance of 4 percent of GDP. 
This was presented as an alternative to exchange rate targeting, 
but that can be questioned. 
According  to  most  macroeconomic  models,  including 
those that I have used in estimating “fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rates,” achievement of a given target for the current 
account implies, for a given pressure of demand, a particular 
exchange rate. Presumably this exchange rate would alter with 
a sufficiently large change in the structural conditions in the 
economy, but this merely means that one needs to take the 
likely structural conditions into account when estimating the 
exchange rate target. But if it were easier to agree on current 
C. Fred Bergsten has proposed that a reserve 
currency country should be able to engage 
in counter-intervention to push up the value 
of a currency that is being deliberately 
held down...through intervention.
The Bergsten proposal seems to assume that 
the rest of the international community 
would be happy to go along with giving 
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account targets than on exchange rate targets, such a change in 
presentation might be useful. The more fundamental problem 
is that a current account of a nation includes imbalances with 
other members of a currency union, which a nation would 
therefore be called on to curb but without having an exchange 
rate instrument able to assist in this objective.
Introducing a Reciprocity Requirement: Gros
Daniel Gros (2010) has proposed that the main Western coun-
tries invoke the principle of reciprocity and declare that they 
will henceforth sell public debt only to official institutions from 
countries  in which they have a reciprocal right to purchase 
public debt. He argues that this would be legal under the IMF 
Articles because these require only current account convert-
ibility,  and  not  freedom  of  capital  movements.  One  could 
imagine that the United States and the European Union might 
nonetheless be unwilling to initiate a step that could be seen as 
a reversion toward capital controls, but it would be unfortunate 
if they were on those grounds to dismiss a potentially prom-
ising initiative.
But this proposal does, of course, involve a species of capital 
controls, and one knows that capital controls are leaky. The first 
thing is therefore to examine whether the leaks would be likely 
to jeopardize achieving the objective. Gros argues that this is 
unlikely since it would require one or more financial institu-
tions to become an intermediary for the Chinese and lie to 
the US authorities that the beneficial owner of the assets being 
invested was not from a country in which foreigners cannot buy 
and hold public debt instruments. It is one thing to agree that 
it would be unlikely that the Chinese would be able to continue 
large-scale investments in public debt, but there is also much 
private debt in the United States. Indeed, Gros himself argues 
subsequently the potential benefits to the United States of a 
large move by the Chinese authorities to dump Treasury bills in 
favor of either US bank deposits or other private US assets.8 One 
cannot simultaneously argue that the Chinese would be unable 
to continue financing a large imbalance by buying private US 
assets and that it would be good news for the United States if 
the Chinese dumped Treasury bills in favor of US private assets. 
8. Gros assumes that the existing stock of Treasury securities held by China 
would be grandfathered. 
I find Gros’s second argument the more persuasive, and accord-
ingly I assume that the Chinese could continue to finance their 
imbalance by buying private US assets. An effective sanction 
would have to involve also a prohibition on buying private US 
assets on a nonreciprocal basis, and the policing of that would 
be several orders of magnitude more difficult than anything 
Gros envisaged.
Taxing Asset Accumulation: Hufbauer
Gary Hufbauer (2010) proposes the use of taxation to penalize 
Chinese  accumulation  of  dollars.  He  envisages  the  United 
States giving notice that it would terminate the US-China Tax 
Treaty, and then following this up by Congress allowing the 
Treasury secretary to impose a 30 percent withholding tax on 
the income accruing to a foreign government that maintains a 
seriously undervalued currency. 
Some of the difficulties with the proposal should be noted. 
First, at present interest rates are near zero, and 30 percent 
of near zero is even closer to zero, and therefore not much 
of a disincentive. Second, the Treasury secretary is called on 
to impose this disincentive only on the Chinese government, 
which he would therefore have to name, in a process that one 
could assume would have the same overtones, only more so, 
as the current drama in which he has never to this day named 
the Chinese government as a manipulator. Third, decisions 
are envisaged as being made by the US government rather 
than by an international process. Fourth, and arising directly 
from the foregoing, unless it were on an international scale 
involving all the potential reserve currencies it would give a 
big incentive to the emergence of multiple reserve currencies. 
Fifth, it would involve a change in the US policy of allowing 
without question untaxed foreign holdings of US government 
securities9 and might therefore undermine foreign will to hold 
dollars. There has to be a question as to whether the United 
States would be prepared to risk the reserve currency role of 
the dollar.
ComParison of The ProPosals
Central ideas of both of the two previous attempts to discipline 
surplus countries envisaged the possibility of charging interest 
payments on excessively large accumulations of international 
reserves, along with the ability of the international commu-
nity to insist on a change in the exchange rate. The Keynes 
plan envisaged penalizing a country for accumulating exces-
sive bancor balances. A country running a surplus would have 
had to convert it into bancor and thus make itself potentially 
subject to the discipline. A central measure envisaged in the 
9. Except by countries like Iran, which are declared the target of sanctions.
Timothy Geithner has proposed that 
members of the G-20 should commit to 
not running current account imbalances 
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US Indicators’ Proposals (the Volcker Plan) was also payment 
of interest on the holding of excessive reserves. In this case 
the reserves would have been compared to an indicator level; 
a leading candidate for assigning indicators would have been 
IMF quotas, so at this level the proposal could easily have been 
very similar to the Keynes Plan. (However, as earlier noted, 
the Keynes Plan did assume that every country had centralized 
payments through the central bank, which is very different 
from the system that has evolved in the postwar decades.)
The  idea  of  fining  countries  for  defying  international 
norms of behavior has never been applied in practice in the 
monetary realm, although the initial version of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (before it was gutted for reasons of national 
expediency by France and Germany) provided for such penal-
ties. The practice has, however, been implemented in the trade 
field. For example, the United States is currently paying Brazil 
to avoid retaliation in the cotton case that it has lost in the 
WTO. There is no apparent reason why similar disciplines 
should not be applied for inappropriate adjustment policies.
The basic difference between the two older approaches 
and those currently on the table lie in using reserve accu-
mulation as a measure of the need for adjustment: Both the 
Keynes Plan and the Volcker Plan proposed that countries 
accumulating excessive reserves should be subject to interna-
tional pressures. This possibility is not mentioned in any of 
the current proposals. The Goldstein proposal envisages that 
the initiating variable should be a current account surplus, 
which is a joint outcome of the exchange rate and the levels 
of demand, but the judgment concerns the appropriateness 
of the exchange rate. Both the Mattoo-Subramanian and the 
Bergsten proposals judge countries directly on an inappro-
priate level of the exchange rate, rather than on its outcome 
or its integral.10 The technical difficulties reside in the need 
to reach a decision on whether an exchange rate can be called 
misaligned. The Geithner proposal was widely welcomed for 
apparently avoiding an exchange rate judgment, but as already 
argued this was more apparent than real. 
In fact there is a far more fundamental difficulty as well. 
Members of a currency union do not have an exchange rate 
between them that can be varied in order to effect adjustment, 
10. That is, the accumulation through time of the high reserve levels that 
result, ceteris paribus, from a continuing balance of payments surplus.
and yet—unless one believes that Germany has no responsibil-
ities vis-à-vis the Greeces of this world—one needs to identify 
adjustment obligations in such cases too.
The fundamental point is that basing adjustment obliga-
tions on the stock of reserves requires that a surplus result in the 
accumulation of a well-defined reserve stock. If, for example, a 
mere accounting change could result in reserves being labeled 
something else and thus escaping the charge, the discipline 
would be ineffective. To take an obvious current example, the 
discipline would be ineffective if a surplus country was enti-
tled to shunt its holdings of reserves into a sovereign wealth 
fund and in that way escape the charge. But presumably one 
would not want to prohibit countries from exchanging assets 
in the ground for paper portfolios (on the model of Norway), 
so  one  couldn’t  simply  prohibit  sovereign  wealth  funds. 
Indeed, unless one wants to prohibit capital movements, one 
would presumably wish to exempt current account surpluses 
(deficits) that were matched by capital outflows (inflows), at 
least if these promise to be a reasonably dependable source 
of capital. The problem, which was already recognized in the 
Volcker Plan, then becomes one of establishing which capital 
flows are acceptable as forms of adjustment, since it would 
seem utterly perverse to include speculative flows that may 
be reversed in short order as consistent with balance. Two 
conceivable ways of making a distinction would be on the 
basis of sector ownership or maturity: to accept private-sector 
capital outflows as constituting adjustment or to accept long/
medium-term outflows as implying adjustment.11 The former 
seems unlikely to be acceptable to many countries in an era 
when public-sector ownership has found new favor, and the 
latter bristles with problems. Some of the most stable capital 
flows have in practice been the build-up of short-term assets, 
while long-term assets are not necessarily held for a long time. 
Certainly they would not all be held for the long term if one 
created an incentive to avoid short-term assets.
The Gros proposal is immune to this difficulty, because the 
Chinese government also owns the Chinese sovereign wealth 
fund. Similarly the Hufbauer proposal envisages imposing addi-
tional taxes on all assets owned by the Chinese government.
What of the feasibility of the alternative of judging the 
appropriate level of the exchange rate, as envisaged in both the 
Goldstein and Mattoo-Subramanian proposals? As it happens 
I am in the business of producing estimates of equilibrium 
exchange rates (Cline and Williamson 2010), so I am hardly 
in a position to argue that this is impossible. But I do not 
doubt for a moment that there will be economists who argue 
that this is a misplaced endeavor. However, recall that Mattoo 
11. This was the basis of the old liquidity concept of the balance of payments 
once used by the United States.
Both Goldstein and Mattoo-Subramanian 
propose a graduated system of 
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and Subramanian acknowledged the uncertainty in the enter-
prise and argued that it was only in the case of pretty large 
misalignments that the WTO would be expected to ask the 
IMF whether a misalignment exists and that in such cases 
the determination is relatively robust and criticism-proof. Of 
course, no approach based on estimating equilibrium exchange 
rates can be applied within a monetary union.
Both Goldstein and Mattoo-Subramanian propose a grad-
uated system of penalties for undervaluation, thus avoiding the 
classic problem that the Fund has historically had no way of 
enforcing the conclusions of its surveillance between remon-
stration and expulsion. Both envisage that in severe cases the 
WTO should be asked to authorize the use of trade retaliation 
as an enforcement device. They differ, however, in their sugges-
tion of who should hold the responsibility. Goldstein proposes 
to rely on the IMF to initiate a surveillance mission, and to 
make the substantive decisions, merely using the WTO to do 
its bidding when the need for enforcement arises. Mattoo and 
Subramanian propose, in contrast, to base the determination 
in  the  WTO,  using  the  traditional  mechanism  of  country 
complaints to initiate the action and confining the questions 
addressed to the Fund to specific issues where expertise on 
exchange rate issues is required, and using the existing dispute 
settlement  mechanism  as  the  disciplining  device.  Bergsten 
envisages that the individual reserve currency country would 
initiate  counter-intervention,  although  the  Fund  would  be 
able to countermand this decision if it concluded that the facts 
did not justify it.
If one is choosing between these proposals, one needs 
to judge how suitable the IMF and WTO are for the roles 
assigned to them. In the IMF there is no tradition of enforce-
ment, which is reflected in the fact that the Fund lacks any 
mechanism to enforce its views on the surplus countries it 
has surveilled between expressing its opinion on the one hand 
and  expelling  them  on  the  other.  (This  problem  has  been 
discussed by Truman 2009, but his solution of a more robust 
peer review process to provide the needed discipline is depen-
dent on more internalization of external consequences by all 
member countries than some of us consider likely.) Countries 
can, and frequently do, ignore the views that are expressed. 
Goldstein is acutely aware of this and therefore sees a need to 
be able to authorize more robust action; hence he proposes 
to have the Fund get the WTO to authorize the use of trade 
retaliation, but the question then arises of whether the WTO 
would automatically have to approve a Fund request. It hardly 
seems likely to act that way, but Goldstein does not discuss 
what would be involved in getting a Fund request approved 
or how the IMF is supposed to react if its request for WTO 
action is refused.
In contrast, the Mattoo-Subramanian proposal is much 
more complete. They contrast the ability of countries to take 
the initiative in the WTO with the practice of relying on the 
management and staff in the case of the IMF. The latter are 
likely to be especially reluctant to challenge the policies of 
members while they are endeavoring to change the Fund’s 
reputation for being hard-nosed. (Even so, they are likely to 
be more willing to challenge individual countries than the 
gentlemanly  Executive  Board.)  Mattoo  and  Subramanian 
contrast the legitimacy of the IMF, which has been eroded 
by the reluctance of the European countries to cede power as 
emerging markets grow, with the fact that in the WTO power 
grows organically as nations’ trade increases.  
They  give  examples  of  the  sorts  of  questions  that  the 
WTO could have posed to the IMF in the case of China, and 
which would have required factual answers from the Fund:
n  What are the estimates of undervaluation suggested by 
the CGER12 models?
n  What is the preponderance of evidence from studies on 
China’s exchange rate misalignment? 
n  Is  the  level  of  the  exchange  rate  being  maintained  by 
intervention by the government or the central bank?
The WTO would then be in a position to declare whether 
a currency was undervalued as a result of deliberate govern-
ment policy, and the consequences of a finding of undervalu-
ation would follow well-established precedents.
The Bergsten proposal envisages overcoming the problem 
of lack of an enforcement capacity in the IMF by having one 
or more of its members employ an enforcement mechanism 
(subject to a right of appeal). A critical issue concerns the 
feasibility of the proposed enforcement mechanism. There are 
two distinct issues here: whether the proposed enforcement 
mechanism is feasible (1) against countries with nonconvert-
ible currencies and (2) against those with convertible curren-
12. CGER stands for Consultative Group on Exchange Rates, which is the 
group of staff members that the Fund has established to make estimates of 
equilibrium exchange rates. 
The Mattoo-Subramanian proposal 
contrasts the ability of countries to 
take the initiative in the WTO with the 
practice of relying on the management 
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cies. Consider first the feasibility of action against a country 
like  China  with  a  nonconvertible  currency.  If  the  United 
States purchased sufficient nondeliverable forward contracts, 
the  effect  (assuming  that  China  maintained  unchanged  its 
pegging  policy,  or  appreciated  by  less  than  implicit  in  the 
forward contract) would be that when the contracts expired 
the United States would lose money on them. This hardly 
seems likely to exert pressure on China to alter its policy. To 
the extent that the United States purchased renminbi-denom-
inated assets in Hong Kong, the effect would be to push up 
the price of those assets and reduce their rate of return, but it 
is not apparent how this would impact the exchange market 
or  therefore  the  renminbi  exchange  rate. To  do  that,  one 
would have to offer to buy renminbi at a higher price than 
was being offered by the Chinese authorities. (Having got the 
renminbi, there would be no opportunity of investing them.) 
The people selling renminbi are the Chinese importers, who 
could presumably be induced by the Chinese government to 
refuse this offer. (If not, there would be an opportunity of 
unlimited profitable arbitrage by the private sector.) In short, 
I do not see how effective pressure could be brought to bear on 
a country with an inconvertible currency. 
Consider  next  whether  counter-intervention  offers  an 
effective pressure against countries with convertible curren-
cies. In this case the country authorized to take action (say, the 
United States) against the country believed to have an under-
valued currency would offer to buy that country’s currency at 
the same rate and in the same amount that the country was 
selling its currency in exchange for dollars. This would make it 
impossible for the country with the undervalued currency to 
manage its own exchange rate, which is the object of the exer-
cise. If this led to a revaluation of the undervalued country’s 
currency, the US Treasury would stand to make a profit. The 
conclusion is therefore that this would provide a potent tool in 
the case of a convertible currency.
But that provides the clue as to why this instrument has 
not been used in the past. It would give the United States the 
ability to undo the effect of intervention by countries that the 
United States judged to be undervalued, which would compel 
those countries to either revalue to a satisfactory rate or to 
float (provided that it could persuade the IMF). One unwel-
come byproduct would be a big new incentive to avoid making 
currencies  convertible.  More  fundamentally,  the  Bretton 
Woods system, and its successor, rest on an implicit bargain 
between the center country and the rest: The center country 
agreed to forgo the use of exchange rate policy, in return for 
use of the center country’s currency as the principal reserve 
asset. (That solved the famous n – 1 problem.) One may take 
the view that this was a bad bargain for the United States or 
that there were limits beyond which the United States could 
not be expected to—and has not—lived with other countries’ 
exchange rate preferences, but it is unlikely that the rest of the 
world would agree that henceforth the United States will gain 
the power to insist that other countries revalue or float, even 
subject to an IMF vote, without a fundamental reconstruction 
of the international monetary system. 
The  Geithner  proposal  was  intended  for  naming  and 
shaming, but it is not well adapted for judging the consistency 
of  present  policies.  In  particular,  the  focus  on  the  current 
account outcome means that it would be too long-lagged to be 
a useful device for securing ex ante consistency. An exchange 
rate is continuously available, and a current change will have 
an influence in the future. So if one is concerned with evalu-
ating how countries behaved over some past period, a current 
account objective provides a good test; but if one wants to test 
whether current policies are appropriately adapted to securing 
a particular future outcome, then a current account target 
provides infinite opportunities for obfuscation. It is always 
possible to plead that there are special circumstances or that 
the future is (as it usually is) unusually uncertain. One can 
welcome the Geithner proposal without thereby believing that 
it offers an alternative solution to this particular problem.
synThesis: Combining The goldsTein and 
maTToo-subramanian ProPosals
I have argued that both of the two older proposals assumed a 
role for reserves that they no longer have and are unlikely to 
regain. The Bergsten proposal seems to me to assume that the 
rest of the international community would be happy to go 
along with giving a special position to the United States. I have 
just argued that the Geithner proposal is not adapted to this 
particular role. The Gros proposal would be ineffective because 
it ignores the possibility of China holding private assets. I in 
fact think it likely that some version of the Hufbauer proposal 
will ultimately be implemented by the United States, if China 
maintains its current policy, but I take it that an ideal policy 
would work through an international mechanism rather than 
reliance on national action. That leaves two of the proposals 
for consideration.
The first point is that it is not clear that the Goldstein and 
Mattoo-Subramanian proposals have to be considered as alter-
natives. Why not require that the Fund examine the policies of 
any country with a surplus above a certain level (presumably 
relative to GDP) and also allow any member to initiate action 
in the WTO? The worst that could happen is that resources 
were wasted on conducting two studies when one would have 
done (and anyway much of both studies would be done by 
the same people). In practice one would expect that countries 
with independent currencies would normally be the subject N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 0 1   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 1
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of a WTO procedure, at least where the spillover effects are 
strong, but there would still be a mechanism for examining 
the surpluses of members of monetary unions and there would 
be a forum to propose the adoption of measures designed to 
correct  their  disequilibria.  Basing  such  studies  in  the  IMF 
might seem objectionable to the members of monetary unions, 
but one should not object to the alternative of the monetary 
union itself taking this responsibility, provided that it does not 
dismiss it as a nonproblem. If a monetary union agrees to do 
this, the IMF should simply hear charges that the surplus of 
the monetary area, rather than of the individual countries that 
comprise it, is excessively large.
Whether the work is undertaken by the IMF or within 
the  monetary  union,  the  charge  that  a  surplus  is  possible 
only because of excessive deficits elsewhere in the monetary 
union cannot be answered by an appraisal of the exchange 
rate. This would make no sense for a member of a monetary 
union; for example, it would be quite inappropriate to vary 
the euro exchange rate to achieve German (or Greek) ends 
(quite apart from any difficulty there may be in persuading 
floating exchange rates to float to levels that might achieve 
policymakers’ ends). Insofar as exchange rates are controllable 
by policymakers, these should look at the collective needs of 
the monetary area, not those of a particular country. 
Policy therefore has to be focused on the level of internal 
demand, since there is no exchange rate instrument. The ques-
tion is whether the monetary union has an appropriate level 
of demand to be consistent with aggregate supply arising from 
the sum of the supply potential of individual members, any 
acceptable  payments  imbalance  for  the  monetary  union  as 
a whole, and the continued solvency of all members of the 
monetary union. It is fine for Germany to program demand 
to be less than supply if other members of the monetary union 
are in a position to finance offsetting deficits, or if the mone-
tary union as a whole is generating a surplus that is acceptable 
to the rest of the world. But if neither is true then Germany’s 
surplus can only be labeled excessive. The logical corollary of 
a finding of an excessive surplus by a member of a monetary 
union is a recommendation to increase the level of internal 
demand  of  that  country,  rather  than  a  revaluation  of  the 
common currency. Unlike in a separate monetary area, where 
increased demand can be offset by appreciation, demand has 
to be increased even if the likely result is internal inflation. 
That is the logic of having entered a monetary union (and 
the rationale for following the principle, adopted in name in 
Europe although not always practiced, of refusing member-
ship to countries that would require their partners to inflate in 
order to achieve reasonable external balance). Once countries 
have entered a monetary union, they have to be willing to 
subject their internal price levels to the requirements of reason-
able external balance, in the way that Germany deflated (too 
much in retrospect) when it judged its initial euro exchange 
rate a little overvalued. Conversely, the IMF (or more likely 
the European Central Bank [ECB]) will have to take on the 
unfamiliar task of telling certain members—though not the 
whole  monetary  union—that  they  need  to  be  prepared  to 
accept more inflation.
For the vast majority of countries that are not members of 
currency unions, action could be initiated either by the IMF 
or by the WTO. In both cases the analysis would focus on 
the appropriateness of the exchange rate13 and would therefore 
be essentially similar. In the case where action is initiated by 
a country in the WTO, it would be necessary to spell out 
what is meant by “the IMF.” Specifically, if a series of technical 
questions were posed by the WTO to “the IMF,” it would 
be important that these be answered apolitically, i.e., by the 
management and staff rather than requiring the endorsement 
of an Executive Board that remains responsible to national 
governments. The policy change would require endorsement 
by the Board, but that is a quite different matter to requiring 
the Board to hold itself responsible for approving every answer. 
In contrast, one could hardly imagine the Executive Board 
surrendering its power if, as in the Goldstein Plan, there were 
no alternative place where political power could be exercised 
(like in the WTO).
However, agreeing to institute the Mattoo-Subramanian 
proposal does depend upon a political willingness to implement 
the scheme, and one of the parties whose agreement is required 
is (in practice, if not in theory) the Chinese government. It has 
to be recognized that, despite the incentives to buy into this 
scheme, it is possible that China will remain resistant. In that 
case one has to ask whether there are available incentives to alter 
13. This is not to deny that current accounts are also influenced by savings and 
investment or indeed that ex post the current account is identically equal to 
the difference between them. But given a figure for the level of income (deter-
mined by inflation targeting or a notion of full employment or a Taylor Rule), 
there is a 1:1 correspondence between the steady-state exchange rate and the 
current account balance, as originally shown by Meade (1951). The practice of 
observing that the current account balance is equal to S – I and then believing 
that one has shown the irrelevance of the exchange rate is a demonstration of 
economic illiteracy. 
If the Mattoo-Subramanian proposal is to be 
implemented, it will probably also require 
the threat of imposition of additional taxes 
on Chinese foreign earnings to persuade 
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Chinese policies that do not depend upon the acquiescence 
of the Chinese government, which leads one to think of the 
Hufbauer suggestion: China would not be able to evade the 
imposition of additional taxation. If the Mattoo-Subramanian 
proposal is to be implemented, it will probably also require 
the threat of imposition of additional taxes on Chinese foreign 
earnings to persuade China to agree to such a proposal.
ConCluding remarks
It has been argued that both of the past two proposals to hold 
surplus countries responsible for initiating adjustment suffer 
from the same problem: the impossibility of devising a suitable 
test of whether a country needs to adjust on the basis of its 
reserve holdings in the contemporary world. In many ways the 
Mattoo-Subramanian proposal represents an attractive alterna-
tive: It focuses attention on the exchange rate rather than reserve 
holdings, it seeks to use the IMF in an area where it undoubt-
edly has expertise, but it also seeks to exploit the greatest success 
in international cooperation in recent years, namely the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the WTO. 
This  proposal  suffers  from  two  limitations,  however:  It 
requires agreement by the Chinese government, and it is unable 
to address the problem created when a member of a monetary 
union runs an excessive surplus. It is argued that the best chance 
of addressing the first limitation is by adding a threat of addi-
tional taxation of Chinese government-held securities unless 
China were to agree to the Mattoo-Subramanian proposal (in 
addition to the incentives they propose, WTO guarantees that 
their sovereign wealth fund would have right of investment 
plus US recognition of market economy status for China). The 
second could be addressed by running the Goldstein proposal 
(perhaps operated by the ECB rather than the IMF) in parallel 
to the Mattoo-Subramanian proposal. This could enable the 
international community to address this problem also, although 
it would be necessary to tweak the Goldstein proposal so that in 
this case it was not focused on the exchange rate issue but was 
prepared to recommend demand expansion even at the cost of 
faster national, as opposed to eurowide, inflation.
The division of the burden of adjustment between surplus 
and deficit countries is an issue that has been with us for at least 
70 years. It is doubtful if the world can wait another 70 years 
before the international community addresses it.
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